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I. INTRODUCTION 
A virtual stand-off is occurring in the halls of vacant buildings of 
the Milwaukee Public School system (MPS). On one side stands the 
     †  J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2018; B.A. Economics, 
B.A. Religion, Pepperdine University, 1991. I would like to thank Professor Mark 
Edwards for his helpful feedback during the writing process. I dedicate this article 
to my children—Courtney, Chloe, Charis, and Caleb. They are truly an inspiration 
to me. 
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Wisconsin State Legislature and its leadership; on the other side 
stands MPS, its board of directors, and the Milwaukee Common 
Council. At stake is the education of thousands of Milwaukee 
children. Anxious observers include the governor, business groups, 
and teachers’ unions. Everyone wonders how the stand-off will end. 
Prior to 2011, although the City of Milwaukee owned all MPS 
properties, it “could not sell or lease any empty [MPS] building 
without approval from the Milwaukee Board of School Directors.”1 
After a December 2010 article in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
reported that MPS was blocking several high-performing charter and 
voucher schools from purchasing its vacant buildings, “the state 
legislature passed 2011 Act 17 which [allowed] the Milwaukee 
Common Council to sell unused or underutilized buildings without 
MPS approval.”2 
According to a 2015 report released by the Wisconsin Institute 
of Law and Liberty, at least seventeen MPS buildings were still vacant 
in January 2015, costing taxpayers over $1.6 million to maintain over 
the previous three years.3 Despite interest from several high-
performing private and public charter schools, MPS has allowed its 
unused buildings to sit empty for an average of seven years.4 
Several schools with national reputations for successfully 
educating children in the Milwaukee area have expressed interest in 
purchasing MPS’s unused buildings, only to see their applications or 
letters of intent rejected without explanation.5 In one instance, MPS 
turned down offers to purchase a vacant facility made by several 
private schools, stating it would instead enter into an agreement with 
a developer to turn the school into a residential and community 
center.6 At the time, critics accused MPS of quickly conceiving the 
1. WIS. INST. FOR LAW & LIBERTY, INC., MPS AND THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE IGNORE
STATE LAW AND POLICY 1 (2013), https://www.will-law.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2016/02/2013-09-05-WILL-Report-with-Exhibits-23.pdf. 
2. Id.
3. RICK ESENBERG ET AL., WHY THE STATE OF WISCONSIN FORCED COCA-COLA TO
SELL TO PEPSI: AN EXPLANATION OF THE STATE’S NEW REFORMS TO MILWAUKEE’S




5. See id. at 4–8.
6. Erin Richards, 9 Months After Development Deal, Malcolm X Academy Remains
Empty, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (July 30, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com 
/news/education/9-months-after-development-deal-malcolm-x-academy-remains    
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idea to prevent a competing private school from expanding.7 The 
community center never came to fruition, but MPS still had to pay 
over $500,000 to the developer.8 
Often, one of the most significant obstacles for expanding 
schools is finding affordable facilities that meet their needs. In June 
2016, the Walton Family Foundation announced that it had 
committed $250 million for the sole purpose of assisting urban 
charter schools in gaining access to facilities.9 In its statement 
announcing the commitment, the Foundation said that finding 
suitable spaces for charter schools “is the biggest barrier to creating 
high-quality educational options for children and families.”10 
To most observers, the state of affairs for education in 
Milwaukee is disturbing, particularly for African American students. 
While 98% of school districts in the state of Wisconsin met or 
exceeded expectations according to the latest performance data 
released by the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, MPS 
was the only district that failed to meet expectations.11 Only thirty 
schools in MPS met or exceeded expectations, which meant over 
two-thirds of MPS students attended substandard schools.12 
Although the graduation rate for white students in Wisconsin has 
risen as high as 93% in recent years, the overall graduation rate for 
African American students in Wisconsin has hovered around 61%.13 
-empty-b99320209z1-269243081.html. 
7. Erin Richards, MPS Splits with Malcolm X Developer but Still Owes Fees,
MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Sept. 23, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/news 
/education/mps-splits-with-malcolm-x-developer-but-still-owes-fees-b99356741z1      
-276412281.html. 
8. Bobby Tanzilo, MPS Details Malcolm X Settlement for City Committee,
ONMILWAUKEE (Oct. 8, 2014), https://onmilwaukee.com/raisemke/articles 
/malcolmxzoning.html. 
9. Emma Brown, Walton Family Foundation Commits $250 Million for New Charter




11. Erin Richards, 88% of Schools, 98% of Districts Make Grade in Report Cards,
MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Sept. 16, 2014), http://archive.jsonline.com/news 
/education/88-of-schools-98-of-districts-make-grade-in-report-cards-b99352167z1     
-275218351.html. 
12. See id.
13. Annysa Johnson & Kevin Crowe, Wisconsin’s Graduation Rate Gap Widens to
Largest in U.S., MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Oct. 23, 2015), http://archive.jsonline 
.com/news/education/wisconsins-graduation-rate-gap-widens-to-largest-in-us      
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In fact, Wisconsin has the worst education gap in the country, with 
African American students far behind the achievement levels of their 
white classmates.14 
Under Wisconsin law, “[p]ublic education is a fundamental 
responsibility of the state,”15 and the impact of MPS’s poor 
performance is felt far beyond the city limits of Milwaukee. 
According to the MacIver Institute, in 2011, high school dropouts 
burdened Wisconsin taxpayers with an estimated $503 million in 
additional incarceration, Medicaid, and lost income tax costs—
approximately $170 million in incarceration costs, $150 million in 
increased Medicaid costs, and $183 million in lost income tax.16 MPS 
is the state’s largest school district, and over half of MPS’s budget is 
funded by the state.17 
In 2015, the Wisconsin legislature passed another law 
addressing MPS’s unused buildings, which forced Milwaukee to sell 
unused and underutilized school buildings to public charter schools 
and private schools.18 Despite the new law, MPS leadership and the 
Milwaukee Common Council resisted and delayed placing these 
properties on the market, arguing that there was a lack of 
community input and due process in passing the new law.19 
MPS has also resisted efforts by the legislature to address the 
district’s poorest performing schools.20 An additional component of 
-b99601248z1-336334851.html. 
14. Molly Beck, National Report Card: Wisconsin’s Achievement Gap Worst in Nation,
WIS. ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local 
/education/local_schools/national-report-card-wisconsin-s-achievement-gap-worst 
-in-nation/article_82406e47-5738-5e95-9cb0-78aee1e14254.html (comparing 
reading and math scores between white and African American fourth- and eighth-
graders in Wisconsin); accord Johnson & Crowe, supra note 13. 
15. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.01(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
16. Christian D’Andrea, The High Costs of High School Dropouts in Wisconsin, 
MACIVER INST. (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.maciverinstitute.com/2013/04/the 
-high-costs-of-high-school-dropouts-in-wisconsin/. 
17. STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND
EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: SCHOOL
YEAR 2013–14 (FISCAL YEAR 2014) 8 (2017),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016303.pdf. 
18. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.61(3).
19. See Patrick Marley & Annysa Johnson, Scott Fitzgerald: Legislature May Cut
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the legislation passed in 2015 was an effort to deal with persistent 
problems in MPS by creating a “turnaround” district that would 
develop plans to dramatically improve up to five of MPS’s poorest 
performing schools.21 MPS officials rejected the proposed plan and 
offered an alternative plan, but the MPS plan was criticized by many 
as drastically watered-down and not in alignment with the new law.22 
In light of MPS’s continued efforts to challenge legislative 
intent, lawmakers must decide which options are best to make 
progress and address some of the educational problems in 
Milwaukee. The legislature could pass additional legislation that 
would further restrict MPS’s ability to bypass or delay legislative 
intent. The state could also sue the city and MPS to force 
compliance. However, both of these options would likely involve 
several months of wrangling in the court system or debate in the state 
legislature before the buildings are sold and begin to be used for the 
education of Milwaukee students. 
Another option, albeit controversial, might be available to the 
state. Could the legislature use the state’s power of eminent domain 
to take control of unused MPS buildings and turn them over to high-
performing private and charter schools to educate Milwaukee’s 
children? While eminent domain remains a controversial tool of 
governmental entities to acquire property, it presents attractive 
options to consider, despite its potentially divisive public policy 
considerations. 
Asked what options the legislature would consider to ensure 
MPS compliance with the 2015 law directing the district to sell 
unused property, exasperated Senate Majority Leader Scott 
Fitzgerald stated, “I wouldn’t take anything off the table when it 
comes to MPS.”23 
Could eminent domain be on the table? 
II. BACKGROUND ON EMINENT DOMAIN
Black’s Law Dictionary defines eminent domain as the “inherent 
power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, esp. 
land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable 
21. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.9001–.9004.
22. See Marley & Johnson, supra note 19.
23. Id.
5
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compensation for the taking.”24 Kelo v. City of New London25 is 
considered the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case involving the use 
of eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner to 
another private owner. 
In Kelo, after Pfizer Inc. announced plans to build a $300-million 
research facility in New London, Connecticut, the City of New 
London initiated a development plan for ninety acres in the 
surrounding area to capitalize on the arrival of the Pfizer facility and 
the new commerce and economic development it was expected to 
generate.26 Essential to the development plan was acquiring property 
through eminent domain.27 The city successfully negotiated the 
purchase of most of the real estate in the area, but negotiations with 
the owners of fifteen of the necessary properties failed.28 The 
remaining property owners sued the city, claiming that “the taking 
of their properties would violate the ‘public use’ restriction of the 
Fifth Amendment.”29 
With no assertion that any of the properties were blighted or 
otherwise in poor condition, the Court held that the city’s exercise 
of eminent domain authority in furtherance of economic 
development satisfied the public use requirement.30 It reasoned that, 
because of the comprehensive nature of the plan and “thorough 
deliberation that preceded its adoption,” the plan served a public 
purpose.31 
The dissenting justices had significant concerns about the 
precedent set by Kelo.32 Specifically, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
feared that “[a]ny property may now be taken for the benefit of 
[other] private part[ies],” which likely have disproportionate 
influence and power in the political process.33 In a separate dissent, 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s primary concern was the Court’s 
apparent shift from the Fifth Amendment’s “public use” clause to a 
24. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
25. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
26. See id. at 473–74.
27. See id. at 475.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 489–90.
31. Id. at 484.
32. See id. at 494–505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505–23 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). 
33. Id. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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“public purpose” test.34 He argued, “the most natural reading of the 
Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the 
government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property, 
as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity 
whatsoever.”35 
The Court’s decision sparked significant backlash. Outraged 
state legislatures across the country fast-tracked legislation to restrict 
the ability of government agencies to take private property.36 Even 
President George W. Bush issued an executive order restricting the 
federal government’s use of eminent domain.37 
 A few years after Kelo, the doctrine of eminent domain took 
another twist. Following the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the 
related problems with subprime mortgages, some local governments 
in states with the most severe declines in housing values attempted 
to use what has been termed “reverse eminent domain” to seize 
underwater mortgages.38 Although this approach, like conventional 
eminent domain, involves the government taking private property 
and giving it to another private entity for some public use, it is often 
called reverse eminent domain because instead of the government 
removing people from their homes, homeowners remain in their 
houses, and part of the property of banks (the value of the 
mortgage) is taken.39 
 Banks, as well as the Federal Housing Finance Agency, have 
expressed several concerns regarding the use of eminent domain for 
this purpose.40 One of the major concerns is the potentially chilling 
34. Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 508.




38. See, e.g., Carrie B. Reyes, Reverse Eminent Domain Facts and Fiction, FIRST
TUESDAY J. (May 12, 2004), http://journal.firsttuesday.us/reverse-eminent-domain 
-facts-and-fiction /35969. 
39. See Les Leopold, Our Most Powerful Weapon Against Wall Street? The Rise of
Reverse Eminent Domain, ALTERNET (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.alternet.org/economy/our-most-powerful-weapon-against-wall-street    
-rise-reverse-eminent-domain (giving examples of reverse eminent domain and of 
people using reverse eminent domain to remain in their homes). 
40. See FHFA to Cities: Don’t Abuse Eminent Domain, REALTORMAG (Aug. 12,
2013), http://realtormag.realtor.org/daily-news/2013/08/12/fhfa-cities-dont 
-abuse-eminent-domain (discussing the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s 
statement warning against the use of reverse eminent domain); Leopold, supra note 
7
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effect on credit extension and housing market investment, which 
could have a significant negative impact on consumers and their 
ability to obtain credit.41 Another concern is the risk of loss to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and the resulting costs imposed on U.S. 
taxpayers.42 Lawsuits filed by banks opposing this approach have 
been pending in several communities across the country.43 The 
primary argument made by the coalition against the use of reverse 
eminent domain is that it is an impermissible taking because the 
transfer of loans would likely fail to satisfy the public use 
requirement.44 
This article considers yet another kind of reverse eminent 
domain that, although having a different focus, is not without 
controversy. Disputes between public entities over the power of 
eminent domain arise on a regular basis due to the number of these 
entities, their scope of activities, and the vast jurisdictions involved.45 
When a public entity seeks to take property owned by another public 
entity, the usual analysis of eminent domain doctrine and its 
principles must be viewed through a different lens. Takings involving 
property already in public use shift assumptions regarding the 
concept of public purpose, the balance of power between 
condemnor and condemnee, and the notion of reciprocity of 
advantage. 
The following analysis will examine the law involving takings of 
public property by public entities.46 Specifically, it considers whether 
the state of Wisconsin has the authority and requisite public purpose 
to acquire vacant MPS facilities through eminent domain for the use 
of independent education providers.47 
39 (describing the backlash by banks against reverse eminent domain). 
41. Letter from Am. Bankers Ass’n, et al., to Alfred Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.aba.com/Advocacy 
/LetterstoCongress/Documents/Mortgage-ED-JointLetter-090712.pdf. 
42. Id. at 4.
43. Shaila Dewan, Eminent Domain: A Long Shot Against Blight, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/in-richmond 
-california-a-long-shot-against-blight.html. 
44. Id.
45. See generally Joris Naiman, Judicial Balancing of Uses for Public Property: The
Paramount Public Use Doctrine, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 893, 894 (1990) (providing 
an overview of various public entity disputes regarding eminent domain). 
46. See infra Part III.
47. See infra Part III.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Comparison: Wisconsin and Minnesota 
 According to Wisconsin’s eminent domain statute, 
government entities may “acquire by condemnation any real estate 
and personal property appurtenant thereto or interest therein which 
they have power to acquire and hold or transfer to the state, for the 
purposes specified, in case such property cannot be acquired by gift 
or purchase at an agreed price.”48 If the state is acquiring the 
property, the determination of the necessity of exercising the power 
of eminent domain is determined by the state itself, as the 
condemning authority.49 The state’s invocation of eminent domain 
is itself a conclusion that the taking is necessary. 
Arguably, the most significant case regarding eminent domain 
in Wisconsin decided prior to Kelo is Grunwald v. City of West Allis.50 
In Grunwald, the plaintiff brought an action against the city to 
challenge the condemnation of his property as part of a 
redevelopment project, arguing that the city failed to establish that 
the area met the definition of a “blighted area.”51 The Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin ruled that Wisconsin’s eminent domain 
statutes pertaining to blighted property should be “liberally 
construed to remove blight and prevent its reoccurrence” and that 
the trial court’s finding that the redevelopment area was a blighted 
area was “not clearly erroneous.”52 
 The Grunwald court also stated that judicial review of the 
power to exercise eminent domain is limited to determining 
whether decisions on blighted areas were based on “fraud, bad faith, 
or gross abuse of discretion.”53 In other words, if the condemnor has 
reasonable grounds for its decision, the decision will be upheld. 
Wisconsin was among the states to respond quickly to Kelo. 
Under legislation passed in 2005, eminent domain cannot be used 
to acquire unblighted property under any circumstances if it is to be 
later sold to a private entity.54 Specifically, section 32.03(6)(b) states, 
48. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.02 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
49. Id. § 32.07.
50. 551 N.W.2d 36 (Wis. 1996).
51. Id. at 38.
52. Id. at 42.
53. Id. at 40.
54. Hugh Braun, Wisconsin’s Response to Condemnation for Economic Development,
WIS. LAW., Sept. 2007, http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications /WisconsinLawyer 
9
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“Property that is not blighted property may not be acquired by 
condemnation by an entity authorized to condemn property . . . if 
the condemnor intends to convey or lease the acquired property to 
a private entity.”55 
Wisconsin’s statute is more restrictive than many states’, but it 
exempts condemnation of “blighted” property, which it defines 
broadly as 
any property that, by reason of abandonment, dilapidation, 
deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provisions 
for ventilation, light, air, or sanitation, high density of 
population and overcrowding, faulty lot layout in relation 
to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness, unsanitary or 
unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or other 
improvements, or the existence of conditions that 
endanger life or property by fire or other causes, or any 
combination of such factors, is detrimental to the public 
health, safety, or welfare.56 
This expansive definition provides governmental entities in 
Wisconsin great flexibility in declaring blight. 
 To gain perspective on how much flexibility Wisconsin has in 
its eminent domain statute, a comparison to its neighbor, the 
Gopher State, is revealing. In Minnesota, which was also among the 
states that were swift in responding to Kelo, a large part of the 
motivation to change eminent domain laws was a controversial 
private development project.57 
 In 2000, city officials in the Minneapolis suburb of Richfield 
began a project to assist electronics retailer Best Buy in building a 
$160 million, 1.6 million-square-foot corporate headquarters.58 City 
officials claimed the project would be a much-needed boost to a 
community that had been losing population and economic 
prospects since the 1970s.59 By 2003, the project was completed, 
/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume =80&Issue=9&ArticleID=1417. 
55. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03(6)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
56. Id. § 32.03(6)(a).
57. See Terry Pristin, Eminent Domain Revisited: A Minnesota Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/05/realestate/eminent-domain 
-revisited-a-minnesota-case.html?_r=0 (“In response to cases like this one, the 
Institute for Justice will support bills in the coming session ‘to prohibit the taking of 
property for so-called economic development,’ said Lee McGrath, the executive 
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displacing over eighty homes and businesses.60 Although there was 
some community support for the project, property rights advocates 
vowed at the time to support bills that would prohibit “so-called 
economic development” projects that they believed were improper 
takings by overreaching municipalities.61 
 After Kelo in 2005, the Minnesotans for Eminent Domain 
Reform Coalition was formed to capitalize on the widespread 
outrage over the decision and push for changes in Minnesota law 
that would only allow eminent domain for a public use, such as 
roads, public buildings, and infrastructure.62 The coalition was large 
and ideologically diverse, with members including the Automobile 
Dealers Association, Farm Bureau, Petroleum Marketers Association, 
National Federation of Independent Business, Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce, NAACP, Urban League, and Teamsters, among others.63 
In the end, the coalition was able to get bipartisan legislation 
introduced and passed in 2006, only three years after the completion 
of the Best Buy project.64 
 Ostensibly, post-Kelo laws in Wisconsin and Minnesota had the 
same primary objective: to prevent the government from taking 
property from one private owner and transferring it to another. 
Wisconsin’s law specifically prohibits condemnation if the 
condemnor intends to convey the property to a private entity, unless 
it is blighted.65 In Minnesota, eminent domain may only be used for 
a public use,66 and the public benefits of economic development “do 
not by themselves constitute a public use or public purpose.”67 
 There are significant differences between the laws of the two 
states, however, and they are found in the definitions of key terms 
within the statutes. Specifically, in Minnesota, “public use” 
exclusively refers to 
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. John Vomhof, Coalition Calls for Eminent Domain Reform, MINNEAPOLIS/ST.
PAUL BUS. J. (Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2006 
/01/02/daily30.html?jst=b_ln_hl. 
63. Minnesota Enacts Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform, CASTLE COALITION
(May 19, 2006), http://castlecoalition.org/2312. 
64. See Pristin, supra note 57.
65. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03(6)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
66. MINN. STAT. § 117.012, subdiv. 2 (2016).
67. Id. § 117.025, subdiv. 11(b).
11
Hoze: Public Stand-Off: The Wisconsin State Legislature v. Milwaukee Pu
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2017
20 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW SUA SPONTE [Vol. 43:6 
(1) the possession, occupation, ownership, and 
enjoyment of the land by the general public, or by public 
agencies; 
(2) the creation or functioning of a public service 
corporation; or 
(3) mitigation of a blighted area, remediation of an 
environmentally contaminated area, reduction of 
abandoned property, or removal of a public nuisance.68 
 Prior to the Kelo decision, Minnesota’s statutory definition of 
a “blighted area” was surprisingly similar to Wisconsin’s very broad 
definition currently in use. In 2005, a “blighted area” under 
Minnesota statute was 
any area with buildings or improvements which, by reason 
of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty 
arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light, and 
sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land 
use, or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or 
other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, 
or welfare of the community.69 
 With the passage of the 2006 legislation, however, Minnesota’s 
definition has narrowed significantly. Now, a “blighted area” is 
defined as property that is “in urban use” and “where more than 50 
percent of the buildings are structurally substandard.”70 To qualify 
as “structurally substandard,” the property must be a building 
(1) that was inspected by the appropriate local 
government and cited for one or more enforceable 
housing, maintenance, or building code violations; 
(2) in which the cited building code violations involve 
one or more of the following: 
(i) a roof and roof framing element; 
(ii) support walls, beams, and headers; 
(iii) foundation, footings, and subgrade conditions; 
(iv) light and ventilation; 
(v) fire protection, including egress; 
(vi) internal utilities, including electricity, gas, and 
water; 
(vii) flooring and flooring elements; or 
(viii) walls, insulation, and exterior envelope; 
68. Id. § 117.025, subdiv. 11(a) (emphasis added).
69. Id. § 469.002, subdiv. 11 (2005).
70. Id. § 117.025, subdiv. 6 (2016).
12
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(3) in which the cited housing, maintenance, or 
building code violations have not been remedied after two 
notices to cure the noncompliance; and 
(4) has uncured housing, maintenance, and building 
code violations, satisfaction of which would cost more than 
50 percent of the assessor’s taxable market value for the 
building, excluding land value, as determined under 
section 273.11 for property taxes payable in the year in 
which the condemnation is commenced.71 
This narrow definition provides strong protections for property 
owners against eminent domain and limits the strong influence 
developers typically have in the process of declaring blighted 
property. As stated by Lee McGrath, executive director of the 
Minnesota Chapter of the Institute for Justice, “[b]efore the 
government can call a property ‘blighted,’ it must prove to a court 
that the property poses an actual and significant threat to health or 
safety. ‘Blight’ in Minnesota is no longer whatever a developer or 
bureaucrat wants it to be.”72 
 Indeed, opponents of the use of eminent domain for 
economic development purposes often point to private sector 
developers’ prominent role in the process of declaring blighted 
property.73 Developers typically drive the process by identifying 
suitable sites, developing plans, and bringing public and private 
sector partners to the table.74 Essentially, municipalities give 
developers the power of condemnation by allowing them to have a 
substantial role in the determination of what property is blighted 
and setting the boundaries for the redevelopment project.75 
It is important to note that Wisconsin’s eminent domain statute 
is silent on the status of the condemned property at the time of the 
taking.76 Specifically, there is no significance placed upon (1) 
whether the current property owner is a private or public entity, or 
(2) whether the property’s current use is for a private or public 
purpose.77 Rather, the focus in the statue is on whether the 
71. Id. § 117.025, subdiv. 7.
72. Minnesota Enacts Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform, supra note 63.
73. See, e.g., Rebecca Leung, Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, CBS NEWS (Sept.
26, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eminent-domain-being-abused/. 
74. See, e.g., id.
75. See Harold L. Lowenstein, Redevelopment Condemnations: A Blight or a Blessing
upon the Land?, 74 MO. L. REV. 301, 307–08 (2009). 
76. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
77. See id.
13
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appropriated property is blighted and whether it is conveyed to a 
private entity.78 Therefore, if a property is declared blighted, or if the 
property is conveyed to a public entity, the statute appears to provide 
significant latitude to the condemnor. 
B. Options for the Wisconsin Legislature 
Legislative leaders have various options in their effort to make 
unused MPS properties available, each with its own unique 
requirements: (1) pass additional legislation, (2) exercise eminent 
domain based upon existing Wisconsin law, or (3) exercise eminent 
domain under the “paramount public use” doctrine. 
1. Additional Legislation
Lawmakers could pass additional legislation to make it more 
difficult for MPS to bypass or delay the sale of its unused buildings. 
However, MPS and city officials have shown little interest in 
complying with existing laws.79 In a March 2016 Zoning Committee 
meeting of the Milwaukee Common Council, the city attorney 
informed the committee that the city could be sued if it failed to sell 
buildings.80 “Let them sue us,” responded one alderman, and the 
committee held any further action so that it could seek additional 
legal advice.81 
Cutting state funding for MPS is possible, but it would also 
require passing additional legislation. State legislators who represent 
districts in Milwaukee would likely oppose any MPS budget cuts. So, 
passing another bill would likely take significant time and expend 
substantial political capital, which may be in short supply due to 
competing legislative priorities. 
78. Id.
79. See Annysa Johnson, Statute Blocks MPS Interest in Empty Buildings, City
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2. Eminent Domain Based on Existing Wisconsin Law
a. Blighted Property
Although the language in section 32.03 describing blighted 
property may appear to focus on property that has been abandoned 
and left to deteriorate, the text uses general terms that could 
potentially qualify vacant MPS buildings as blighted property.82 
Specifically, the statute states that blighted property means “any 
property that, by reason of . . . usefulness . . . is detrimental to the 
public health, safety, or welfare.”83 Therefore, statutory language does 
exist that could permit the state to use eminent domain to acquire 
MPS properties. 
Because the buildings are intended for educational purposes 
but remain vacant, the state could argue they meet the definition of 
blighted property. While the facilities are left idle, they are not being 
used to educate Milwaukee’s children, and maintenance costs are 
incurred. The lack of its usefulness for education, combined with 
MPS’s public education resources that are wasted on maintenance 
costs, likely demonstrates that public welfare is detrimentally 
impacted. 
Additionally, vacant MPS properties could be considered 
blighted under another aspect of the statute’s broad definition: 
detrimental impacts on public safety. Blighted property was 
discussed in a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case, Bank of New 
York Mellon v. Carson.84 In Carson, the court ruled that Wisconsin’s 
abandoned premises statute85 authorized courts to order banks to 
sell abandoned foreclosures “within a reasonable time” to minimize 
harm to communities.86 Although the case involved abandoned 
residential property, at least some of the principles the court used to 
support its position that abandoned properties should be sold in a 
timely manner can be applied to vacant MPS properties. 
Vacant properties, despite being maintained, can be more 
prone to criminal activities, which impacts public safety.87 The court 
82. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03.
83. Id. § 32.03(6)(a) (emphasis added).
84. 859 N.W.2d 422 (Wis. 2015).
85. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.102.
86. See Carson, 859 N.W.2d at 432.
87. See generally Charles C. Branas, David Rubin & Wensheng Guo, Vacant
Properties and Violence in Neighborhoods, ISRN PUB. HEALTH (Sept. 10, 2012), 
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2012/246142/ (showing a “significant 
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in Carson observed that the legislature recognized the potential harm 
that vacant buildings can do to communities by its passage of an 
abandoned premises statute to deal with the issue, stating, “Because 
its context and the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 846.102 clearly 
indicate that the statute was intended to help municipalities deal 
with abandoned properties in a timely manner, we decline to 
interpret it so as to permit properties to languish abandoned.”88 
MPS could argue that its properties are vacant and not 
abandoned, as evidenced by the district’s incurred costs to maintain 
the properties. However, the lack of traffic in and around the 
facilities, combined with a reduced level of security at the facilities, 
makes the properties potential magnets for criminal activity and 
possible public nuisances. Therefore, given the broad definition of 
blighted property in section 32.03(6)(a) and the legislative intent 
behind the abandoned premises statute, the state could take MPS 
buildings under the eminent domain statute.89 
b. Emergency Condemnation
Within the eminent domain statute is an emergency 
condemnation provision.90 The required elements of emergency 
condemnation are that (1) there is an urgent need for the property, 
(2) a contract for the purchase of the property cannot be achieved, 
(3) there is an approval from the governor, and (4) there is tender 
of an award of damages to the owner.91 Once these elements are met, 
the state may take immediate possession of the property.92 
First, to satisfy the urgent need element, the state could point to 
specific needs at both the state and local levels.93 For example, 
Milwaukee has the highest concentration of African American 
students in the state.94 National Assessment of Educational Progress 
association between vacant properties and the risk of aggravated assault”). 
88. Carson, 859 N.W.2d at 432.
89. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03(6)(a).
90. Id. § 32.21.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. (allowing for condemnation “[w]henever any lands or interest
therein are urgently needed by any state board, or commission, or other agency of 
the state”).  
94. QuickFacts: Milwaukee City, Wisconsin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/5553000,00 (last visited Apr. 
21, 2017). 
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tests show a significant achievement gap between African American 
and white students in Wisconsin.95 Average scores for African 
American students are some of the lowest scores in the nation.96 
Moreover, according to the U.S. Department of Education, 
Wisconsin has the largest disparity in graduation rates between 
African American and white students.97 Therefore, given the state’s 
obligation to provide essential public education, utilizing MPS 
buildings to partner with private voucher and charter schools to help 
close the achievement gap could be viewed as an urgent need. 
Second, there needs to be a determination as to whether a 
contract to purchase the property can be made.98 Despite the 
legislature passing laws requiring MPS buildings to be sold,99 the 
district refuses to comply.100 MPS and the City of Milwaukee have 
passed “policies that explicitly prohibit[] private schools in the 
choice program from purchasing the buildings,” thereby frustrating 
the legislative intent of the law.101 Because MPS and the City have 
placed deed restrictions on these properties preventing “competing 
use,” purchase contracts are nearly impossible to obtain.102 
Third, the governor’s approval is required to take possession of 
a property.103 Governor Scott Walker signed legislation impacting 
MPS vacant buildings and has been supportive of efforts to better 
utilize the buildings.104 Whether he will be supportive enough to give 
his approval and place himself in the middle of a controversial 
eminent domain issue is another question. If emergency 
condemnation is necessary to take the property, the governor’s 
approval will likely depend on the political environment and 
circumstances at the time. 
95. Beck, supra note 14.
96. Id.
97. Johnson & Crowe, supra note 13.
98. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.21 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6).
99. 2011 Wis. Act 17, sec. 4 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 119.60 (2m)(a)(1) (2015)).
 100. See, e.g., WIS. INST. FOR LAW & LIBERTY, INC., supra note 1, at 3–5 (discussing 
the attempts charter and private schools have made to purchase unused schools); 
Paul Brennan, Milwaukee Makes It Hard to Buy Its Many Empty School Buildings, WIS. 
WATCHDOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://watchdog.org/195123/milwaukee-empty 
-schools/ (discussing an attempt to buy MPS property that was turned down). 
101. WIS. INST. FOR LAW & LIBERTY, INC., supra note 1, at 6. 
102. Id. 
103. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.21. 
104. Marley & Johnson, supra note 19. 
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Finally, an award of damages must be tendered to the City of 
Milwaukee in exchange for the taking of property held by MPS.105 
The payment amount may be determined by previous offers made 
by other educational institutions for the properties106 and fair 
market value of the properties.107 
Therefore, with the governor’s approval, the state likely has the 
option of emergency condemnation, as all of the required elements 
appear to be met. After meeting these requirements, the state would 
be free to take immediate possession of vacant MPS buildings and 
sell them to private, high-performing education providers in 
Milwaukee. 
3. Eminent Domain Based on Utilizing the “Paramount Public Use”
Doctrine
The “paramount public use” doctrine addresses takings 
between two public entities that both hold powers of eminent 
domain.108 The paramount public use doctrine requires a court to 
balance the needs of two general condemnors for specific property 
and to determine which use would produce the greater public 
benefit.109 Depending on the jurisdiction employing the doctrine, 
superiority of use can be determined by the character of the 
condemnor or the actual use of the property.110 
a. Superior Use: Character of Condemnor
Although they have their own governing bodies, Wisconsin 
cities are still subject to the authority of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.111 The Wisconsin Constitution states, 
Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law may 
determine their local affairs and government, subject only 
to this constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall 
105. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.21. 
106. ESENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 4–8. 
107. See, e.g., id. at 9 (providing an example of an attempt to purchase an 
institution for its appraised value). 
108. Naiman, supra note 45, at 893. 
109. Id. at 898. 
110. A. S. Klein, Annotation, Power of Eminent Domain as Between State and 
Subdivision or Agency Thereof, or as Between Different Subdivisions or Agencies Themselves, 
35 A.L.R. 3d 1293, § 2(a) (1971). 
111. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
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affect every city or every village. The method of such 
determination shall be prescribed by the legislature.112 
The state’s sovereignty also includes authority over the property of 
its municipalities.113 Even in the absence of a statute expressly 
authorizing the state to appropriate public property, state authority 
over the property of its municipalities is significant. Concerning 
“property within its own borders [and] not held by the [f]ederal 
[g]overnment, a state has broad power of eminent domain, and its 
right to take the property of one of its subdivisions is rarely 
questioned.”114 
States are generally regarded as possessing broad powers over 
cities within their boundaries. For example, in City of Trenton v. New 
Jersey,115 the Supreme Court declared that a city is a “political 
subdivision of the state, created as a convenient agency for the 
exercise of such of the governmental powers of the state as may be 
intrusted [sic] to it.”116 The Court further stated that “[t]he power 
of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held and used for 
‘governmental purposes’ cannot be questioned.”117 
State legislatures have significant authority over property within 
a state, and their eminent domain power is restricted only by 
constitutional limitations.118 Also, legislatures generally have the 
authority to grant eminent domain power to lesser entities, such as 
state agencies, counties, and municipalities.119 
Based on the state’s broad power over its municipalities, the 
Wisconsin State Legislature can likely use eminent domain to 
acquire vacant MPS buildings even without express statutory 
authority. 
b. Superior Use: Purpose
If a superior use of the property is required, the state is likely 
able to demonstrate that its proposed use is paramount to MPS’s use 
in the foreseeable future. Courts in Illinois, New Jersey, and Texas 
112. Id. 
113. See id. § 2. 
114. Klein, supra note 110. 
115. 262 U.S. 182 (1923). 
116. Id. at 185–86. 
117. Id. at 188. 
118. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6 (2016). 
119. See id. § 23. 
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have used some version of the paramount public use doctrine, thus 
they provide valuable insight into its use.120 
In State v. Montgomery County,121 the state of Texas sought to 
prevent Montgomery County from exercising eminent domain.122 As 
part of the condemnation process, the county was required to obtain 
title to a strip of land to be used for a highway project and transfer it 
to the state.123 The court stated that the exercise of eminent domain 
authority between units of government is governed by the doctrine 
of paramount importance, and the focus of this doctrine is on 
whether “the necessity be so great as to make the new enterprise of 
paramount importance to the public, and it cannot be practically 
accomplished in any other way.”124 
Unlike Texas courts, courts in Illinois have focused less on 
necessity and more on the reasonableness of the taking. In City of East 
Peoria v. Group Five Development Co.,125 the City of East Peoria wanted 
to construct a highway, which partially extended over the property 
of a community college district.126 The court ruled that when a 
public entity seeks to take property already devoted to a public use, 
“courts are empowered to consider the reasonableness of the taking, 
and to correct any clear abuses of authority.”127 
A New Jersey case, Township of Weehawken, v. Erie Railroad Co.,128 
demonstrates yet another version of judicial balancing in a 
comparison of public uses. The township sought to condemn land 
owned by a railroad to construct recreational facilities and related 
parking structures.129 In its denial of the township’s condemnation 
of the railroad’s property, the court’s reasoning focused on the 
“reasonable necessity and comparative value of the conflicting 
interests.”130 The court hesitated to offer a general rule for 
 120. See City of E. Peoria v. Grp. Five Dev. Co., 429 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 1981); Twp. 
of Weehawken v. Erie R.R. Co., 120 A.2d 593 (N.J. 1956); State v. Montgomery Cty., 
262 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. App. 2008). 
121. 262 S.W.3d 439. 
122. Id. at 441–42. 
123. Id. at 442. 
124. Id. at 444–45 (quoting Sabine & E.T. Ry. Co. v. Gulf & I. Ry. Co., 46 S.W. 
784 (Tex. 1898)). 
125. 429 N.E.2d 492. 
126. Id. at 492. 
127. Id. at 494 (citation omitted). 
128. 120 A.2d 593 (N.J. 1956). 
129. Id. at 595. 
130. Id. at 597. 
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reasonable necessity but observed that the reasonable necessity for 
the taking should be determined by assessing whether “the 
advantages to the condemnor will largely exceed the disadvantages 
to the condemnee.”131 
Finally, Joris Naiman proposed a paramount public use doctrine 
to resolve conflict between two public entities that focuses on an 
analysis of the broad public necessity of each party’s use: 
A court applying the paramount public use doctrine should 
weigh each party’s need for the contested property, as well 
as the public necessity for each use. A court should avoid 
undue deference to either party’s claim of need, and 
should take a broad view of public necessity. The analysis 
of need should consider each party’s alternatives to using 
the contested property, and any equitable factors 
supporting each party’s use. A court’s analysis of public 
necessity should encompass long-term public welfare and 
noneconomic factors implicated by each party’s use.132 
c. Comparison of Uses
Whether using a standard based on necessity, reasonableness, 
or broad public impact, a comparison of the proposed uses of the 
buildings by MPS and the state is required. In a basic sense, the 
general use of the MPS buildings would not change regardless of 
which entity owned them after the exercise of eminent domain. 
Whether owned by MPS, the state, or a private school, the buildings 
would likely be used to educate children in the City of Milwaukee. In 
order to determine the superior use, a deeper analysis of the 
competing uses is necessary. 
MPS is responsible for educating over 76,000 students in the 
City of Milwaukee, from kindergarten through high school.133 
Students of color represent 88% of its enrollment, and 80% of its 
students are economically disadvantaged.134 The district receives 
almost 60% of its revenues from the State of Wisconsin, with the 
balance coming from federal and local sources.135 
131. Id. (quoting 2 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 440 (3d ed. 1909)). 
132. Naiman, supra note 45, at 915–16 (emphasis added). 
133. At a Glance 2016–17, MILWAUKEE PUB. SCHS. (Nov. 2016), http://mps 
.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/MPS-Shared/Documents/MPS-District-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
134. Id. 
135. See CORNMAN, supra note 17, at 8. 
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Obviously, there is no current use of the property while it sits 
vacant. MPS has floated ideas in the past about potential projects or 
initiatives to utilize specific facilities that are currently idle.136 
However, these projects and initiatives may not come to fruition. 
Also, these potential projects will activate only a handful of the 
seventeen facilities that are currently underutilized,137 which is not a 
sufficient reason to resist the sale of all the vacant facilities, as MPS 
has done up to this point. 
Although the state does not directly educate Milwaukee’s public 
school children, public education is a fundamental responsibility of 
the state, and so, under this mandate, the state is responsible for its 
children’s education.138 Additionally, as MPS’s primary funder, the 
state has a responsibility to its taxpayers to ensure its resources are 
spent effectively. MPS has the largest achievement gap between 
African American and white students in the country, as well as the 
biggest disparity in graduation rates among the two groups.139 
Facilities built to educate Milwaukee’s children sitting vacant and 
requiring millions of dollars in maintenance costs is not an effective 
use of state resources.140 
Even in a broader sense, the failure of MPS—whether fault can 
be placed solely on the district or not—causes increased costs to state 
taxpayers.141 MPS’s low graduation rate is particularly troubling. 
Multiple studies have shown that high school dropouts are more 
likely to utilize public money for health care and welfare, more likely 
to be involved in the criminal justice system, and far less likely to 
contribute to the state’s tax revenues through sustained 
employment.142 
136. See Johnson, supra note 79. 
 137. See Brennan, supra note 100 (discussing how some of the seventeen facilities 
appear to be unutilized). 
138. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.01(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 6). 
139. Johnson & Crowe, supra note 13. 
140. James Wigderson, Report Says Milwaukee Defying State Law Regarding Vacant 
School Buildings, WIS. WATCHDOG (Mar. 14, 2017), http://watchdog.org/290919 
/report-says-milwaukee-defying-state-law-regarding-vacant-school-buildings (“These 
empty [public school] buildings over the course of the last decade have cost 
Milwaukee taxpayers well over $10.2 million.”). 
141. See supra Part I. 
 142. See D’ANDREA, supra note 16; see also Matthew Lynch, Cause and Effect: The 




Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol43/iss6/2
2017] PUBLIC STAND-OFF 31 
Using Naiman’s broad public necessity approach, the state’s 
proposed use of the properties will likely be deemed more valuable 
than MPS’s proposed use. The state’s use has a broader impact, from 
improving education for Milwaukee’s children to ensuring more 
effective utilization of Wisconsin taxpayer resources. From a long-
term public welfare perspective, MPS’s proposed use—leaving the 
buildings vacant indefinitely—is not compelling. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The use of eminent domain inevitably raises several public 
policy concerns. The following analysis considers whether the same 
arguments against takings involving private property should apply to 
those involving public property. 
A. Overstated Objectives and Uncertain Outcomes 
One argument against eminent domain is the difficulty in 
predicting the outcome of a particular project and whether it will 
have positive results. This concern is particularly applicable to 
takings for economic development purposes. The results of the 
redevelopment projects in Kelo143 and Poletown Neighborhood Council 
v. City of Detroit144 provide valuable insight.145
A November 2009 article in the San Francisco Chronicle described 
how the City of New London’s project in Kelo fell far below 
expectations: 
The well-laid plans of redevelopers, however, did not pan 
out. The land where Susette Kelo’s little pink house once 
stood remains undeveloped. The proposed hotel-retail-
condo “urban village” has not been built. And earlier this 
month, Pfizer Inc. announced that it is closing the $350 
million research center in New London that was the anchor 
for the New London redevelopment plan, and will be 
relocating some 1,500 jobs.146 
In Poletown, a neighborhood association and several individual 
residents sued to block the acquisition of a large tract of land for the 
143. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
144. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 
1981). 
145. See id. 
 146. After the Homes Are Gone, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 28, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www 
.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/After-the-homes-are-gone-3209347.php. 
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construction of a General Motors (GM) plant.147 The Michigan 
Supreme Court held that the project, while incidentally benefitting 
a private interest, fell within the meaning of “public purpose” as 
defined in the relevant statute.148 
Despite the projections of GM and city officials that indicated 
the project would create 6150 jobs, the Poletown project did not 
meet expectations.149 Only a few years after displacing 4000 
residents, hundreds of businesses, and destroying 1400 homes, the 
plant only employed approximately 2500 people.150 
Although examples of successful economic development 
projects and other eminent domain takings for public purposes 
exist, these well-known cases demonstrate that it is difficult to 
determine outcomes when projects are conceived. 
 The use of eminent domain to acquire public property, 
however, may not involve the same level of risk if the project fails to 
meet expectations. Because the government is taking property 
already devoted to public use, there is no threat to individual 
property rights. Unlike the projects in Kelo and Poletown, takings of 
public property do not typically involve displacement of residents 
and private businesses. 
Still, MPS might argue that the expectation that the use of the 
facilities by another educational institution will produce superior 
results is unfounded, citing the mixed results in assessments of 
private and charter school performance over the last several years. 
Even though the schools that have attempted to purchase the vacant 
buildings have had success in educating their current students, their 
past performance is not a guarantee of future success. Moreover, 
education needs throughout the district are continually reassessed, 
and buildings that are currently vacant might be required for new 
projects to meet the needs of MPS students. 
 Similar arguments were made in 2008 in Minnesota, when the 
Minneapolis School District considered selling three vacant district 
buildings to high-performing charter schools.151 Some district 
147. Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 457. 
148. Id. at 459. 
149. Ilya Somin, The Case Against Economic Development Takings, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 949, 952 (2005). 
 150. Ilya Somin, Robin Hood in Reverse: The Case Against Economic Development 
Takings, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Feb. 22, 2005, at 1, 2, 
https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa535.pdf. 
151. Tom Weber, Charter Schools to Buy Three Mpls District Buildings, MPR NEWS 
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leaders and members of the community feared that selling to a 
charter school that subsequently underperformed would only result 
in students returning to the district in worse shape academically, and 
the efforts could be a waste of time better spent on planning for an 
alternative use for the building.152 Also, many believed the district 
should keep the building in case enrollment should grow in the 
future.153 
 In the end, the district decided to make the sale,154 despite a 
previous policy banning the sale of any district buildings to charter 
schools.155 Although the move was not without critics, the driving 
factors behind the sale were eliminating debt on the properties and 
adding cash flow to district operations, and the $11.3 million 
received for the three vacant buildings accomplished those 
objectives.156 Minneapolis School Board member Pam Costain called 
the sale “uncharted territory” but supported the partnership because 
“[w]e desperately need to unload property, which carries debt and 
is a burden on our district.”157 
Although educational success for the students enrolled in the 
private or charter schools that take over vacant MPS buildings is not 
guaranteed, it is difficult to argue that the buildings’ use by high-
performing schools will not provide some level of benefit over a 
building left vacant. Also, according to a 2016 report by the 
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, third- through eighth-
grade students in Milwaukee’s charter and private voucher schools 
outperformed their counterparts in public schools in math and 
language arts.158 Because the likely buyers of the buildings will be the 
highest performing private and charter schools in the city and the 
MPS use essentially has no current benefit, academic or financial, 




154. Patrice Relerford, Minneapolis Gives Final OK to Sell Three Schools, STAR TRIB.
(Nov. 26, 2008, 7:27 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-gives-final-ok 
-to-sell-three-schools/35146194/?refer=y. 
155. See Weber, supra note 151. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Annysa Johnson, Vouchers, Charters Outscore Public Schools in Latest Data, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 16, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news 
/education/vouchers-charters-outscore-public-schools-in-latest-data-b99688846z1    
-372279021.html. 
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the project is likely less risky than a typical economic development 
project. 
B. Reciprocity of Advantage 
The concept of reciprocity of advantage should be included in 
any discussion of expected project outcomes in the use of eminent 
domain. Reciprocity of advantage refers to the possibility that a 
property owner may receive some reciprocal benefit from the taking 
of his or her property.159 
In the case of a taking of private property, a property owner 
would need to enjoy some type of advantage from the broader 
community to obtain reciprocity of advantage, such as community 
amenities, better job opportunities, etc.160 Reciprocity of advantage 
in a taking of public property, however, is likely easier to obtain, 
because it simply involves a transition from one public use to 
another.161 There are no individual property rights to balance 
against the proposed public use. 
The potential taking of MPS buildings would not change the 
overall purpose of the property, which is education. It would be 
difficult to demonstrate that MPS receives no reciprocity of 
advantage with the state’s proposed use of the property, because, in 
a broad sense, it is the same purpose and use MPS has for the 
property. 
C. Coercive Takings 
Another argument frequently used against eminent domain is 
that it involves the coercive acquisition of property from its owner. 
The involuntary nature of the taking has created concerns that the 
use of this power will result in oppressive actions by government and 
those who hold power over government. As explained by Neil 
 159. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An 
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 492, 
540 (2006). 
 160. See, e.g., id. at 545 (discussing how Kelo was supposed to bring in over 6000 
jobs to benefit that community). 
 161. See, e.g., id. at 544 (“It has frequently been noted that concerns over 
undercompensation are at their lowest when the proposed public use for the 
condemned property is ‘public’ in the broadest sense. This relationship is true 
because the more that the benefits of a public use inure to the public as a whole, 
the more likely it is that the condemnee is reaping some reciprocity of advantage 
from the taking.”). 
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Komesar, this “majoritarian oppression” is “an abuse of the political 
process by a powerful majority that exerts sufficient control over the 
government such that it can co-opt the eminent domain power to 
confiscate the property of a less powerful minority.”162 Because 
eminent domain is a very powerful tool used to involuntarily take 
property from its owner, it is prone to abuse and can be used to 
oppress those without, or with less, power over government. 
However, the risk of abuse in takings of public property due to 
the coercive nature of eminent domain is mitigated because the 
balance of power between the condemnor and the condemnee is 
more equalized.163 Although the city is a political subdivision of the 
state and holds far less power, the susceptibility of the largest city in 
the state to oppression is significantly less than that of the average 
individual homeowner positioned against a governmental entity.164 
Still, opponents of a taking of MPS property could argue that 
the same components of oppression do exist, except they do not 
involve individual homeowners. They might claim, for example, that 
it is the white, Republican majority in the state legislature forcing its 
will on an institution devoted to serving poor African American 
children in Milwaukee. This majority could be seen as taking 
resources devoted to the education of African American students 
and handing them to private entities that already take resources 
(public funding) that should be going to the city’s public schools. 
However, this argument is flawed because African American 
students are the primary beneficiaries of the reallocation of 
resources the taking makes possible. In fact, one could argue that 
the state would be negligent, or even discriminatory, in its overall 
responsibility for public education if it did not act and attempt to 
provide a superior use for MPS’s vacant buildings. 
 162. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 
958 (citing NEIL KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 60–70 (2001)). 
163. Naiman, supra note 45, at 894. 
 164. Compare Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (explaining the disproportionate power and influence between 
individuals and a governmental entity), and id. at 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(same), with Naiman, supra note 45, at 894–95 (explaining the balance of power 
between condemnor and condemnee in public property situations). 
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D. Local Rule 
 Related to the notion of coercive takings is the question of 
whether the state’s use of eminent domain over MPS buildings would 
be an unlawful intervention into a local matter, bypassing duly 
elected public officials and the will of the people who put them in 
office. A distinction must be made, however, between what is lawful 
and what is politically acceptable. 
 As discussed in Part III, the state has broad authority over its 
political subdivisions.165 The Supreme Court explained, in no 
uncertain terms, the extent of state control over city powers in Hunter 
v. City of Pittsburgh166:
The state . . . at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all 
[city] powers, may take without compensation [city] 
property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand 
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of 
it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy 
the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or 
unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, 
or even against their protest. In all these respects the state 
is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action 
to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by 
any provision of the Constitution of the United States. . . . 
The power is in the state and those who legislate for the 
state are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive 
exercise of it.167 
So, according to the Court, the state legislature controls what, if any, 
powers a city has, and any actions to modify a city’s powers can be 
done without the consent of its citizens.168 
 Still, state actions that impact a city, though lawful, may be 
deemed abusive, oppressive, or unfair by the city’s residents. In those 
situations, the city’s electorate, which is a component of the state’s 
electorate, may have some influence in the state legislature to 
eliminate, or at least mitigate, the perceived abuse of power. 
Specifically, MPS, its board of directors, and the Milwaukee 
Common Council may decide to wage a campaign encouraging city 
residents to contact their representatives in the state legislature to 
165. See supra Section III.B.3.a. 
166. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
167. Id. at 178–79. 
168. Id. at 179 (“The power is in the state, and those who legislate for the state 
are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.”). 
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express their opposition to the state’s seizure of MPS’s vacant 
buildings. 
 Similar protests occurred when dozens of MPS teachers and 
union supporters rallied outside the Milwaukee County Courthouse 
to fight the state’s plan to create a turnaround district that would 
assist in improving some of MPS’s poorest performing schools.169 
The turnaround district is another major component of the 
legislation passed to address MPS’s vacant buildings and, pursuant 
to the new law, is the responsibility of the Milwaukee County 
Executive.170 The protest and general opposition from MPS led to 
the resignation of the commissioner selected by the county executive 
to oversee the turnaround district.171 
 In the end, however, despite formal protests and the existence 
of the independent elected bodies of the Milwaukee Common 
Council and the Milwaukee Board of School Directors, any political 
pressure MPS and its supporters may place on the legislature is 
merely influential and not authoritative. As Gerald Frug put it, 
“[u]nder current law, cities have no ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ power to 
do anything simply because they decide to do it.”172 
 Despite the city’s lack of power against the state, the question 
remains whether it is sound public policy for the state to use eminent 
domain to take MPS buildings. MPS would undoubtedly argue that 
the state’s use of its authority to usurp the power of Milwaukee’s 
residents to manage property paid for with local tax dollars is an 
abuse if its power and sets a dangerous precedent. If these takings 
are allowed, MPS would argue, local governments and their affiliated 
entities could be subject to endless uncertainty in the management 
of their local affairs, caused by the whims, politically motivated 
schemes, or competing priorities of state officials. 
 The state would argue, however, that the taking is necessary 
to fulfill its duties on behalf of state taxpayers. Its overall 
responsibility for public education in the state, and the significant 
portion of the state budget devoted to Milwaukee’s public education 
system, likely warrants aggressive means of protecting the state’s 
169. Bill Hurley, MPS Supporters Rally Against Takeover Plan, in Support of 
Community Schools, MTEA (June 21, 2016), 
http://mtea.weac.org/2016/06/21/10763/. 
170. See Marley & Johnson, supra note 19. 
171. Id. 
172. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062
(1980). 
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interests, particularly in light of resistance from MPS and Milwaukee 
officials in complying with state law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The state has several options to justify use of eminent domain 
to acquire MPS vacant buildings. The property could qualify as 
“blighted property” under the broad definition of the term in the 
state’s eminent domain statutes,173 thereby enabling the state to 
exercise eminent domain with the traditional approach. Contingent 
on the governor’s approval, the state’s taking of MPS buildings could 
also potentially qualify under the “emergency condemnation” 
statute174 due to the urgent need to educate Milwaukee children. 
Finally, using Naiman’s broad public necessity approach within the 
paramount public use doctrine,175 the broader impact of the state’s 
proposed use likely justifies the state exercising eminent domain 
over the MPS buildings. 
The public policy considerations in the use of eminent domain 
for taking public property are different and somewhat less 
controversial than in taking private property. The potential for abuse 
is reduced because the relative power of the public entities involved 
is more balanced. Moreover, the public outcry caused by cases such 
as Kelo and Poletown is unlikely to occur, because there are no 
individual homeowners or businesses displaced. 
The political minefields created if the state chooses to pursue 
eminent domain to acquire MPS’s buildings would likely come from 
the current state and local politics surrounding education issues. 
Specifically, any attempt to forcibly take MPS property would be 
framed by the public versus voucher/charter debate in urban 
education that has existed since the first voucher program was 
introduced during the administration of former governor Tommy 
Thompson in 1989.176 The debate would also include the usual 
opponents and stakeholders in urban education issues: Republicans 
versus Democrats, business groups versus teachers’ unions, etc. 
173. See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
174. See supra Section III.B.2.b. 
175. See supra Section III.B.3. 
176. See A Brief History of Voucher Expansion, WIS. DEP’T PUB. INSTRUCTION,
https://dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/eis/pdf/vhist.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 
2017). 
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 Currently, MPS appears to be vacillating between viewing the 
recently passed bills as merely invitations to partner with the state 
and seeing them as actual laws with which they must comply. MPS 
has refused to place unused buildings on the market and has 
rejected a turnaround district plan by submitting its own counter-
proposal.177 Yet, officials state that “MPS has and will continue to 
meet its obligations under the [new] law.”178 The political stand-off 
will continue until the legislature makes its next move. 
Wisconsin State Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald stated 
that the legislature is prepared to take “even more aggressive moves 
in dealing with MPS.”179 Whether those aggressive moves involve 
cutting state funding for MPS, a lawsuit, or stepping in the 
controversial waters of eminent domain will be determined by 
lawmakers’ political will on the issue and support from the governor, 
as well as other competing legislative priorities. 
177. See Marley & Johnson, supra note 19. 
178. See id. 
179. Id. 
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